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Abstract
Recently in 2018, Niu et al. proposed a measurement-device-independent
quantum secure direct communication protocol using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
pairs and generalized it to a quantum dialogue protocol (Niu et al., Science
bulletin 63.20, 2018). By analyzing these protocols we find some security issues
in both these protocols. In this work, we show that both the protocols are not
secure against information leakage, and a third party can get half of the secret
information without any active attack. We also propose suitable modifications
of these protocols to improve the security.
Keywords— Cryptography; Information leakage; Information-theoretic security; Mea-
surement Device Independent; Quantum secure direct communication; Quantum dialogue.
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography, where the security is based on the laws of quantum physics, is a
remarkable application of quantum mechanics in the field of information theory. In 1984,
Bennett and Brassard first used quantum resources to complete a cryptographic task, and
they generated a secret key between two parties, which is the first quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocol. This is called the BB84 protocol [1], where the parties use a sequence
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of single photons randomly prepared in the rectilinear basis ({|0〉 , |1〉}), and the diagonal
basis ({|+〉 , |−〉}) to produce a random secret key. After that, various QKD protocols have
been proposed by many researchers, such as Ekert’s protocol [2], B92 protocol [3], BBM92
protocol [4], SARG04 protocol [5] and so on [6, 7, 8, 9].
In 2002, quantum secure direct communication (QSDC), a new concept of communicating
messages securely over a quantum channel without any shared key, was first proposed by Long
et. al. [6]. This is a process of secure communication without any cryptographic encryption
or decryption. Here the sender encodes the message on some qubits by using some predefined
encoding rule and sends these qubits to the receiver through a quantum channel. From its
initial stage, QSDC has drawn a lot of attention and has become an interesting topic of
research [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. A bidirectional QSDC protocol, called quantum
dialogue (QD), was first proposed by Nguyen in 2004 [18]. Now there is a large collection
of QD protocols, for example Refs. [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. QSDC protocols for three or
more parties are discussed in [26, 27, 28, 29].
Recently, Niu et al. proposed a measurement-device-independent (MDI) QSDC protocol
using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs [30]. Then they generalized this one-way com-
munication to a bidirectional one and proposed an MDI-QD protocol. In their protocols,
the two legitimate parties prepare two sets of EPR pairs in their place, and send the part-
ner qubits of their EPR pairs to an untrusted third party, since the condition for being an
MDI protocol is that, all the measurements during the communication process should be
performed by an untrusted third party (who may be an eavesdropper). Here we analyze
these protocols and point out that the secret messages are not transmitted securely for both
the protocols. We show that fifty percent of the information about the secret message bits is
leaked out in both the protocols. In other words, in the perspective of information theory and
cryptography, these protocols are not secure. This type of security loophole of information
leakage in various QSDC and QD protocols are discussed in [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. We
also propose modifications of these protocols to improve their security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe the
MDI-QSDC and MDI-QD protocols proposed by Niu et al. [30]. In Section 3, we analyze the
security loophole of the above protocols, and then our proposed remedy is given in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 concludes our work.
2 Brief Review of Niu et al.’s Protocols [30]
In this section, we briefly describe the MDI-QSDC and MDI-QD protocols proposed by Niu
et al. in 2018.
2.1 MDI-QSDC protocol
There are three parties in this protocol, namely, Alice, Bob and Charlie, where Alice wants
to send some message to Bob, and Charlie is an untrusted third party, who performs all the
measurements. They use the EPR pairs |Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Ψ+〉 , |Ψ−〉 for sending the message bits,
where,
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉), |Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − ± |10〉). (1)
The steps of the protocol are as follows:
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1. Alice prepares n EPR pairs randomly in |Ψ+〉 and |Ψ−〉 states and creates two ordered
sets SA1 and SA2 of single photons, such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the i-th qubits of SA1
and SA2 are partners of each other in the i-th EPR pair. Similarly, Bob also prepares
SB1 and SB2 from his n EPR pairs randomly chosen from |Ψ+〉 and |Ψ−〉. Alice (Bob)
also chooses m single qubit states randomly from {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), |−〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)} and inserts these qubits in random positions of SA2 (SB2), and let the
new ordered set be CA2 (CB2) containing (n+m) single qubit states.
2. Alice (Bob) sends the ordered set CA2 (CB2) to Charlie and keeps SA1 (SB1) in her
(his) lab.
3. Charlie makes Bell measurement on each pair of CA2 and CB2 (i.e., the i-th Bell
measurement on the i-th qubit of CA2 and the i-th qubit of CB2 , 1 ≤ i ≤ n+m) and
announces the results.
4. Alice and Bob announce the positions of the single qubit states in the ordered sets CA2
and CB2 respectively. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n+m, four cases may arise.
(a) If the i-th qubit of CA2 and the i-th qubit of CB2 are from SA2 and SB2 re-
spectively, then as a result of quantum entanglement swapping [38], the Bell
measurement causes the corresponding partner qubits of SA1 and SB1 become an
EPR pair, which is shown in Equation (2).
|Ψ+〉A1A2 |Ψ+〉B1B2 =
1
2
(|Ψ+〉A1B1 |Ψ+〉A2B2 − |Ψ−〉A1B1 |Ψ−〉A2B2 +
|Φ+〉A1B1 |Φ+〉A2B2 − |Φ−〉A1B1 |Φ−〉A2B2),
|Ψ−〉A1A2 |Ψ+〉B1B2 =
1
2
(|Ψ−〉A1B1 |Ψ+〉A2B2 − |Ψ+〉A1B1 |Ψ−〉A2B2 +
|Φ−〉A1B1 |Φ+〉A2B2 − |Φ+〉A1B1 |Φ−〉A2B2),
|Ψ+〉A1A2 |Ψ−〉B1B2 =
1
2
(|Ψ+〉A1B1 |Ψ−〉A2B2 − |Ψ−〉A1B1 |Ψ+〉A2B2 +
|Φ−〉A1B1 |Φ+〉A2B2 − |Φ+〉A1B1 |Φ−〉A2B2),
|Ψ−〉A1A2 |Ψ−〉B1B2 =
1
2
(|Ψ−〉A1B1 |Ψ−〉A2B2 − |Ψ+〉A1B1 |Ψ+〉A2B2 +
|Φ+〉A1B1 |Φ+〉A2B2 − |Φ−〉A1B1 |Φ−〉A2B2).
(2)
(b) If the i-th qubit of CA2 is from SA2 and the i-th qubit of CB2 is any single
qubit from the set {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}, then Alice and Bob discard the i-th Bell
measurement result.
(c) If the i-th qubit of CA2 is a single qubit from the set {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} and
the i-th qubit of CB2 is from SB2 , then also Alice and Bob discard the i-th Bell
measurement result.
(d) If both the i-th qubits of CA2 and CB2 are from the set {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}, then
Alice and Bob exchange the basis information of their single qubits. If the bases
are different, then they discard the i-th Bell measurement result. Else it is used
for security checking. A pair of single qubits with identical bases can be written
3
as:
|0〉A2 |0〉B2 =
1√
2
(|Φ+〉A2B2 + |Φ−〉A2B2),
|1〉A2 |1〉B2 =
1√
2
(|Φ+〉A2B2 − |Φ−〉A2B2),
|0〉A2 |1〉B2 =
1√
2
(|Ψ+〉A2B2 + |Ψ−〉A2B2),
|1〉A2 |0〉B2 =
1√
2
(|Ψ+〉A2B2 − |Ψ−〉A2B2);
(3)
and
|+〉A2 |+〉B2 =
1√
2
(|Φ+〉A2B2 + |Ψ+〉A2B2),
|−〉A2 |−〉B2 =
1√
2
(|Φ+〉A2B2 − |Ψ+〉A2B2).
|+〉A2 |−〉B2 =
1√
2
(|Φ−〉A2B2 − |Ψ−〉A2B2),
|−〉A2 |+〉B2 =
1√
2
(|Φ−〉A2B2 + |Ψ−〉A2B2).
(4)
Using the relations (3) and (4), Alice and Bob estimate the error in the channel
and decide to continue the protocol or not.
5. Alice and Bob discard the qubits, which are not entangled, from their ordered sets SA1
and SB1 , and make the new ordered sets MA and MB respectively. Let the number of
discarded qubits from each set be δ, and then each new ordered set contains (n − δ)
single qubits. Alice performs the unitary operation σz [39], on the qubits ofMA, whose
initial states were |Ψ+〉. This process is equivalent to the fact that Alice prepared all
the initial EPR pairs in |Ψ−〉 state. Now, only Bob knows the actual state of the
qubit pairs (MAi,MBi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − δ, where MAi and MBi are the i-th qubits of
the ordered sets MA and MB respectively. Due to quantum entanglement swapping,
(MAi,MBi) is in a Bell state (see Equation (2)).
6. Message encoding: Alice puts some random checking bits on random positions of her
message. She applies one of the four unitary operators (Pauli matrices [39]), I, σx, iσy
and σz, on the qubits of MA, to encode the information 00, 01, 10, and 11 respectively.
To make the protocol secure against the intercept-and-resend attack, Bob randomly
applies I or σz on the qubits of MB .
7. Alice (Bob) sends the ordered set MA (MB) to Charlie, who measures each pair of
qubits of MA and MB on Bell basis and announces the results. From the measure-
ment results, Bob decodes the message of Alice. Then Alice announces the positions
and value of the random checking bits, and from this information, they can check the
integrity of the message. A non-negligible error implies the existence of some eaves-
dropper in the channel.
2.2 MDI-QD protocol
This is a simple generalization of the previous MDI-QSDC protocol. The first five steps are
the same as above. To encode their messages, Alice and Bob divide the pair of ordered set
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(MA,MB) into two disjoint parts (M
1
A,M
1
B) and (M
2
A,M
2
B). One part is used for sending
the message from Alice to Bob and another part is used for sending a message from Bob to
Alice.
3 Security loophole of the MDI-QSDC protocol [30]
In this section, we explicitly analyze the above MDI-QSDC protocol discussed in Section 2.1.
After Charlie has done the first set of Bell measurements of the qubits pairs of SA2 and
SB2 in Step 3, the qubits pairs of SA1 and SB1 become entangled due to entanglement
swapping (Step 4a). Now from Equation (2), we can see that, if the Bell measurement
results of the qubits pairs of SA2 and SB2 are |Φ+〉A2B2 or |Φ−〉A2B2 , then also the states
of the qubit pairs of SA1 and SB1 are |Φ+〉A1B1 or |Φ−〉A1B1 . Similarly, the state of the
qubit pair (A2, B2) = |Ψ±〉A2B2 implies the state of the qubit pair (A1, B1) = |Ψ±〉A1B1 or|Ψ∓〉A1B1 .
After security checking, Alice and Bob discard the qubits, which are not entangled, from
their ordered sets SA1 and SB1 , and make the new ordered sets MA and MB respectively.
So, from the Bell measurement results of the qubit pairs (A2, B2), Charlie knows the states
of the qubit pairs (A1, B1), are either |Φ±〉A1B1 or |Ψ±〉A1B1 . That is, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − δ,
Charlie exactly knows that the qubit pairs (MAi,MBi) are in set Φ = {|Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉} or in set
Ψ = {|Ψ+〉 , |Ψ−〉}.
Now Alice applies σz on the qubits of MA, whose corresponding initial states were |Ψ+〉.
It is easy to check that, if Alice applies σz on MAi for some i, then the state of the qubit pair
(MAi,MBi) changes from either |Φ±〉 to |Φ∓〉 or |Ψ±〉 to |Ψ∓〉. Thus Charlie’s knowledge
about the state of (MAi,MBi) remains same.
Then Alice encodes her message on the qubits of MA by using the unitary operations I,
σx, iσy and σz corresponding the message bits 00, 01, 10, and 11 respectively. That is, the
unitary operators I and σz are used to encode the message bits bb, and the unitary operators
σx and iσy are used to encode the message bits bb¯, where b ∈ {0, 1} and b¯ = bit complement
of b . Bob also randomly applies I or σz on the qubits of MB . They send MA and MB
to Charlie, who measures each pair of qubits (MAi,MBi) in Bell basis, and announces the
results. All the different cases are given in Table 1.
We now show that, in the MDI-QSDC protocol [30], the untrusted third party Charlie
(or any eavesdropper) can get partial information about the secret without any active attack.
For this, we need to discuss the effects of the encoding rules in this MDI-QSDC protocol.
Without loss of generality, suppose the joint state of MAi, MBi before encoding is |Φ+〉, then
Charlie knows that the joint state is in the set Φ.
After Charlie measures (MAi,MBi) in Bell basis, if the measurement result is in the set
Φ, then from Table 1, Charlie concludes that, the secret information is either 00 or 11. Again
if the measurement result is in the set Ψ , then from Table 1, Charlie concludes that, the
secret information is either 01 or 10. Similarly, for the other cases, Charlie exactly knows
that the secret information is bb or bb¯. For both the cases, Charlie can get the exact secret
information with probability 1/2, thus the Shannon entropy, which measures the amount
of uncertainty, is equal to −∑2j=1 12 log 12 = 1 bit. That means, only one bit among two
bits of secret information is unknown to Charlie. One may note that, from the viewpoint of
information theory, this is equivalent to the event that, among two bits of secret information,
Charlie knows the exact value of one bit and does not have any knowledge about the other
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Table 1: Different cases of MDI-QSDC [30].
State of (MAi ,MBi) Message bits Alice’s unitary Bob’s unitary State of (MAi ,MBi)
before encoding of Alice operation on MAi operation on MBi after encoding
|Φ+〉
00 I
I |Φ+〉
σz |Φ−〉
01 σx
I |Ψ+〉
σz |Ψ−〉
10 iσy
I |Ψ−〉
σz |Ψ+〉
11 σz
I |Φ−〉
σz |Φ+〉
|Φ−〉
00 I
I |Φ−〉
σz |Φ+〉
01 σx
I |Ψ−〉
σz |Ψ+〉
10 iσy
I |Ψ+〉
σz |Ψ−〉
11 σz
I |Φ+〉
σz |Φ−〉
|Ψ+〉
00 I
I |Ψ+〉
σz |Ψ−〉
01 σx
I |Φ+〉
σz |Φ−〉
10 iσy
I |Φ−〉
σz |Φ+〉
11 σz
I |Ψ−〉
σz |Ψ+〉
|Ψ−〉
00 I
I |Ψ−〉
σz |Ψ+〉
01 σx
I |Φ−〉
σz |Φ+〉
10 iσy
I |Φ+〉
σz |Φ−〉
11 σz
I |Ψ+〉
σz |Ψ−〉
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bit. Thus we can say that, here in this MDI-QSDC protocol, only fifty percent of the secret
message communicated securely.
By the same argument, we can say that the MDI-QD protocol proposed in [30] is also
not secure against information leakage, and in this protocol, only fifty percent of the secret
messages communicated securely.
Now, we find the root of this information leakage problem in these protocols. Let for
some i, MAi ∈ MA and MBi ∈ MB , and after Alice and Bob apply their unitary operators,
the states MAi and MBi become NAi and NBi respectively. If the joint state (MAi ,MBi) ∈ Φ
or Ψ , then after applying I or σz onMAi (orMBi), the joint state (NAi ,MBi) (or (MAi , NBi))
remains in the same set Φ or Ψ respectively. In other words, both I and σz are applied on
MAi or MBi or both MAi and MBi , map the set Φ to Φ, and Ψ to Ψ . That is, for both the
mappings, the domain and the range sets are same, and if both the joint states (MAi ,MBi)
and (NAi , NBi) belong to the same subset of the Bell states Φ or Ψ , then Charlie concludes
that the message bits are bb. Otherwise, when (MAi ,MBi) and (NAi , NBi) belong to two
different subsets Φ or Ψ , then Charlie concludes that the message bits are bb¯ (i.e., Alice
applies σx or iσy on MAi). So, the main problem in this encoding rule is, Bob’s random
unitary operations can not lower down the information of Charlie about the secret message.
In the next section, we propose a remedy to overcome this security flaw.
4 Proposed modification of MDI-QSDC protocol
In this section, we modify the MDI-QSDC protocol, to make it secure against information
leakage. To resolve the problem discussed in Section 3, Bob needs to apply some random
unitary operators on MBi such that the the union of the range sets, of his unitary operators,
becomes the whole set of Bell states, i.e., for each (MAi ,MBi) ∈ Φ or Ψ and (NAi , NBi) ∈
Φ ∪ Ψ , there exist all the four possibilities of Alice’s two bits message b1b2 (b1, b2 ∈ {0, 1}).
The modified protocol is almost same as the original one. In our modified MDI-QSDC
protocol, Step 1 to Step 5 and Step 7 are same as the MDI-QSDC protocol discussed in
Section 2.1. In Step 6, the encoding process of Alice is the same as the previous one, and
Bob randomly applies σx and I on the qubits of MB (instead of σz and I in the original
one). All the different cases, of the states of the qubit pairs of MA and MB , before and after
encoding are given in Table 2.
We will now show that this modified protocol is secure against information leakage. Again
without loss of generality, suppose the joint state of MAi, MBi before encoding is |Φ+〉, then
Charlie knows that the joint state is either |Φ+〉 or |Φ−〉. From Table 2, it is easy to check
that, before encoding, if the joint state is |Φ±〉, then all the four Bell states can arise after
encoding any two message bits b1b2. Thus Charlie’s knowledge, about the joint state before
encoding, does not help him to extract any information about the secret bits. Similarly for
the other cases also Charlie can not get any secret information about the message bits.
We can also modify the MDI-QD protocol of [30], with a similar approach, i.e., the
receiver applies the unitary I and σx randomly on his (her) state at the time of encoding.
4.1 Other Pauli operators to fix the issue
One can ask, what happen if Bob chooses any other pair of Pauli matrices as his random
unitary operators. To check this, we consider two sets of linear transformations F1 = {I, σz}
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and F2 = {σx, iσy} (note that, every matrix is a linear transformation), where both the
domain and range of these linear transformations are Φ and Ψ . Then, f ∈ F1 implies
that f maps the set Φ to Φ and the set Ψ to Ψ (ignoring the global phase of the Bell
states). Again, f ∈ F2 implies that f maps the set Φ to Ψ and the set Ψ to Φ. Let for
any mapping f , D(f) and R(f) be the domain and range of f respectively. If Bob uses
both his unitary operators from the same set F1 or F2 (i.e., Bob’s unitary operator f1,
f2 =⇒ D(f1) = D(f2) = D (say) and R(f1) = R(f2) = R (say), where both D and R are
either Φ or Ψ), then (NAi , NBi) ∈ R =⇒ (NAi ,MBi) ∈ D. As Charlie knows exactly the set
Φ or Ψ in which the state (MAi ,MBi) belongs, thus from the knowledge that (NAi ,MBi) ∈ D,
Charlie gets the information that “both the bits of Alice’s two bits message are equal or not”.
Now let the two unitary operators of Bob be f1 and f2, where f1 ∈ F1 and f2 ∈ F2.
Then D(f1) = D(f2) = D (say) implies R(f1) and R(f2) are disjoint. Since Φ and Ψ make
a partition of the set of all the two qubits Bell states, thus R(f1) ∪ R(f2) contains all the
Bell states. As Bob randomly chooses between f1 and f2, therefore from the exact state
of (NAi , NBi), Charlie does not know the exact set of the state (NAi ,MBi). For example,
if Charlie knows (MAi ,MBi) ∈ Φ, then for Alice’s message b1b2, all the four Bell state can
occur as the state of (NAi , NBi). So in this case, the protocol is secure against information
leakage.
Hence the collection of all possible choices of Bob’s random unitary operators pairs, from
the set of Pauli matrices, is {(f1, f2) : f1 ∈ F1 and f2 ∈ F2}, i.e., there are four options for
Bob to choose his pair of unitary operators and they are: I and σx; I and iσy; σz and σx;
σz and iσy. One can easily check that, if Bob uses any one pair from the above set as his
random unitary operators, then both the protocols prevent the information leakage problem.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed Niu et al.’s MDI quantum communication protocols and
observed some security issues in both the protocols. We have shown that these protocols are
not secure against information leakage, and one bit among two bits of information is always
leaked without any active attack. Then we have proposed a modification of these protocols,
which are secure against such information leakage problem. We also characterize the set of
Pauli operators, which can alternatively be used to bypass the security flaws.
References
[1] Charles H Bennett and Gilles Brassard. Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution
and coin tossing. arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.06557, 2020.
[2] Artur K Ekert. Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem. Physical review letters,
67(6):661, 1991.
[3] Charles H Bennett. Quantum cryptography using any two nonorthogonal states. Physical
review letters, 68(21):3121, 1992.
[4] Charles H Bennett, Gilles Brassard, and N David Mermin. Quantum cryptography
without Bell’s theorem. Physical review letters, 68(5):557, 1992.
8
Table 2: Different cases of modified MDI-QSDC.
State of (MAi ,MBi) Message bits Alice’s unitary Bob’s unitary State of (MAi ,MBi)
before encoding of Alice operation on MAi operation on MBi after encoding
|Φ+〉
00 I
I |Φ+〉
σx |Ψ+〉
01 σx
I |Ψ+〉
σx |Φ+〉
10 iσy
I |Ψ−〉
σx |Φ−〉
11 σz
I |Φ−〉
σx |Ψ−〉
|Φ−〉
00 I
I |Φ−〉
σx |Ψ−〉
01 σx
I |Ψ−〉
σx |Φ−〉
10 iσy
I |Ψ+〉
σx |Φ+〉
11 σz
I |Φ+〉
σx |Ψ+〉
|Ψ+〉
00 I
I |Ψ+〉
σx |Φ+〉
01 σx
I |Φ+〉
σx |Ψ+〉
10 iσy
I |Φ−〉
σx |Ψ−〉
11 σz
I |Ψ−〉
σx |Φ−〉
|Ψ−〉
00 I
I |Ψ−〉
σx |Φ−〉
01 σx
I |Φ−〉
σx |Ψ−〉
10 iσy
I |Φ+〉
σx |Ψ+〉
11 σz
I |Ψ+〉
σx |Φ+〉
9
[5] Valerio Scarani, Antonio Acin, Gre´goire Ribordy, and Nicolas Gisin. Quantum cryp-
tography protocols robust against photon number splitting attacks for weak laser pulse
implementations. Physical review letters, 92(5):057901, 2004.
[6] Gui-Lu Long and Xiao-Shu Liu. Theoretically efficient high-capacity quantum-key-
distribution scheme. Physical Review A, 65(3):032302, 2002.
[7] Peng Xue, Chuan-Feng Li, and Guang-Can Guo. Conditional efficient multiuser quan-
tum cryptography network. Physical Review A, 65(2):022317, 2002.
[8] Fu-Guo Deng and Gui Lu Long. Bidirectional quantum key distribution protocol with
practical faint laser pulses. Physical Review A, 70(1):012311, 2004.
[9] Hoi-Kwong Lo, Marcos Curty, and Bing Qi. Measurement-device-independent quantum
key distribution. Physical review letters, 108(13):130503, 2012.
[10] Almut Beige, Berthold-Georg Englert, Christian Kurtsiefer, and Harald Weinfurter.
Secure communication with a publicly known key. arXiv preprint quant-ph/0111106,
2001.
[11] KJ Bostro¨m and Timo Felbinger. Ping-pong coding. Phys. Rev. Lett.,
89(quant-ph/0209040):187902, 2002.
[12] Fu-Guo Deng, Gui Lu Long, and Xiao-Shu Liu. Two-step quantum direct communication
protocol using the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pair block. Physical Review A, 68(4):042317,
2003.
[13] Fu-Guo Deng and Gui Lu Long. Secure direct communication with a quantum one-time
pad. Physical Review A, 69(5):052319, 2004.
[14] Chuan Wang, Fu-Guo Deng, Yan-Song Li, Xiao-Shu Liu, and Gui Lu Long. Quantum
secure direct communication with high-dimension quantum superdense coding. Physical
Review A, 71(4):044305, 2005.
[15] Chuan Wang, Fu Guo Deng, and Gui Lu Long. Multi-step quantum secure direct com-
munication using multi-particle Green–Horne–Zeilinger state. Optics communications,
253(1-3):15–20, 2005.
[16] Jian Wang, Quan Zhang, and Chao-jing Tang. Quantum secure direct communication
based on order rearrangement of single photons. Physics Letters A, 358(4):256–258,
2006.
[17] Wei Zhang, Dong-Sheng Ding, Yu-Bo Sheng, Lan Zhou, Bao-Sen Shi, and Guang-Can
Guo. Quantum secure direct communication with quantum memory. Physical review
letters, 118(22):220501, 2017.
[18] Ba An Nguyen. Quantum dialogue. Physics Letters A, 328(1):6–10, 2004.
[19] Zhanjun Zhang. Deterministic secure direct bidirectional communication protocol. arXiv
preprint quant-ph/0403186, 2004.
[20] Man Zhong-Xiao, Zhang Zhan-Jun, and Li Yong. Quantum dialogue revisited. Chinese
Physics Letters, 22(1):22, 2005.
10
[21] Yan Xia, Chang-Bao Fu, Shou Zhang, Suc-Kyoung Hong, Kyu-Hwang Yeon, and Chung-
In Um. Quantum dialogue by using the GHZ state. arXiv preprint quant-ph/0601127,
2006.
[22] Ji Xin and Zhang Shou. Secure quantum dialogue based on single-photon. Chinese
Physics, 15(7):1418, 2006.
[23] Gan Gao. Two quantum dialogue protocols without information leakage. Optics com-
munications, 283(10):2288–2293, 2010.
[24] Arpita Maitra. Measurement device-independent quantum dialogue. Quantum Infor-
mation Processing, 16(12):305, 2017.
[25] Nayana Das and Goutam Paul. Two efficient device independent quantum dialogue
protocols. arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.03518, 2020.
[26] Ting Gao, Feng-Li Yan, and Zhi-Xi Wang. Deterministic secure direct communication
using GHZ states and swapping quantum entanglement. Journal of Physics A: Mathe-
matical and General, 38(25):5761, 2005.
[27] Xing-Ri Jin, Xin Ji, Ying-Qiao Zhang, Shou Zhang, Suc-Kyoung Hong, Kyu-Hwang
Yeon, and Chung-In Um. Three-party quantum secure direct communication based on
GHZ states. Physics Letters A, 354(1-2):67–70, 2006.
[28] Gao Ting, Yan Feng-Li, and Wang Zhi-Xi. A simultaneous quantum secure direct
communication scheme between the central party and other m parties. Chinese Physics
Letters, 22(10):2473, 2005.
[29] Xiaoqing Tan, Xiaoqian Zhang, and Cui Liang. Multi-party quantum secure direct
communication. In 2014 Ninth International Conference on P2P, Parallel, Grid, Cloud
and Internet Computing, pages 251–255. IEEE, 2014.
[30] Peng-Hao Niu, Zeng-Rong Zhou, Zai-Sheng Lin, Yu-Bo Sheng, Liu-Guo Yin, and Gui-Lu
Long. Measurement-device-independent quantum communication without encryption.
Science Bulletin, 63(20):1345–1350, 2018.
[31] Man Zhong-Xiao and Xia Yun-Jie. Improvement of security of three-party quantum
secure direct communication based on GHZ states. Chinese Physics Letters, 24(1):15,
2007.
[32] Fei Gao, Su-Juan Qin, Qiao-Yan Wen, and Fu-Chen Zhu. Comment on:“Three-party
quantum secure direct communication based on GHZ states” [Phys. Lett. A 354 (2006)
67]. Physics Letters A, 372(18):3333–3336, 2008.
[33] Fei Gao, Fen-Zhuo Guo, Qiao-Yan Wen, and Fu-Chen Zhu. Revisiting the security of
quantum dialogue and bidirectional quantum secure direct communication. Science in
China Series G: Physics, Mechanics and Astronomy, 51(5):559–566, 2008.
[34] Yong-gang Tan and Qing-Yu Cai. Classical correlation in quantum dialogue. Interna-
tional Journal of Quantum Information, 6(02):325–329, 2008.
11
[35] Gao Fei, Wen Qiao-Yan, and Zhu Fu-Chen. Teleportation attack on the QSDC protocol
with a random basis and order. Chinese Physics B, 17(9):3189, 2008.
[36] Lian-Ying Wang, Xiu-Bo Chen, Gang Xu, and Yi-Xian Yang. Information leakage in
three-party simultaneous quantum secure direct communication with EPR pairs. Optics
Communications, 284(7):1719–1720, 2011.
[37] Gan Gao. Information leakage in quantum dialogue by using the two-qutrit entangled
states. Modern Physics Letters B, 28(12):1450094, 2014.
[38] Marek Zukowski, Anton Zeilinger, Michael A Horne, and Aarthur K Ekert. “event-
ready-detectors” Bell experiment via entanglement swapping. Physical Review Letters,
71:4287–4290, 1993.
[39] Michael A Nielsen and Isaac Chuang. Quantum computation and quantum information,
2002.
12
